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Samuel Fleischacker: a Third Concept of Liberty, Judgement and Freedom in Kant and Adam Smith (1999)

By Barry Stocker
August 11th, 2010 at 11:38 am | 1 Comment | Posted in Book Review, Liberal Philosophy, Political theory

sfFleischacker is a Professor at University of Illinois-Chicago. Though all his degrees and academic appointments are from the USA, he is English in origin. He is a leading Adam Smith scholar, author of On Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations: A Philosophical Companion (2004) and co-editor of Essays on Adam Smith’s Moral Philosophy (2010). Amongst currently active thinkers inspired by classical liberalism, he could be taken as representing the other pole to Chandran Kukathas, who was discussed in my last post. Fleischacker is definitely a ‘liberal’ in what is now the normal sense in America, that is someone of egalitarian left leaning inclinations. However, he is also much less of a statist social democrat than the average American ‘liberal’, and he tries to establish an alternative to the kind of top down statism often employed to advance social egalitarianism. He is critical of libertarians for what he sees as indifference to the need for government action to aid liberty, but much of what he says fits with those libertarian thinkers who believe government has a role in promoting public goods.

Fleischacker looks back to Adam Smith and to the German philosopher Immanuel Kant, who will be addressed soon in this series of posts. Kant was greatly influenced by the Scottish Enlightenment, and has similar ideas to Smith about the benefits of free trade, property rights, and individual liberty under law. Kant also puts those Scottish Enlightenment ideas in the context of a philosophy much more concerned with ‘transcendental’ questions, that is questions of the limits of knowledge, and the way our knowledge of the world depends on the nature of our consciousness.

One part of Kant’s study of our consciousness is concerned with the power of judgment itself, which he thinks is at work in our taste for beauty and our philosophy of nature. Fleischacker is particularly concerned with beauty in Kant, which Kant connects with the most inner and subjective aspects of judgment. Kant’s view of our power for subjective judgements of beauty, is that it joins with everyone else’s judgement of beauty in ways which are the basis of communication, which join subjective pleasure with universal standards. For Kant, the capacity for judgments of beauty is deeply connected with our freedom as human beings and with our capacity to make moral judgements regarding other free individuals.

This aspect of Kant builds, in part, on ideas in Hume and Smith about the improvement of human morality, liberty, and taste over history. It is this capacity which provides a third concept of liberty beyond, the ‘negative’ liberty of freedom from interference, and the ‘positive’ liberty of collective action to provide conditions of liberty.
Fleischacker looks at liberty and self-determination in Kant in the first part of the book, and follows it up in the second part with an examination of the moral and political aspects of Smith’s Wealth of Nations (1776). Fleischacker thinks of Smith’s political economy as referring to the kind of values of moral reflection and freedom from external domination, that can be found in Kant. He looks at how for Smith, the increase in the prosperity and independence of labourers is a prime concern.

Fleischacker refers to the various points in Smith, which identify the manipulation of markets by the rich and powerful who try to exclude competitions. Merchants collude in trying to rig markets against new competitors, guild masters try to limit and control the people entering that guild.

Fleischacker looks at Smith’s famous line about the benefits we receive from the self-interest of butchers, bakers and brewers, rather than from their benevolence. The main point for Fleischacker is the value of personal independence. It is better for me to depend on myself for my food and drink, rather than depend on anyone’s charity. Fleischacker also notes Smith’s enthusiasm for indirect taxes on luxury goods rather than taxes which bear on the poor, and his disdain for those who look down on, and preach at, the poor for their supposed irresponsibility. Fleischacker’s extrapolation that Smith would be a supporter of redistributive tax and welfare policies are no doubt open to debate, but his views are certainly based on deep knowledge of Smith’s writings.

The last part of A Third Concept of Liberty is concerned with John Rawls, the dominant figure in recent egalitarian liberal political theory. Though Fleishacker agrees with Rawls’ overall view, he thinks Rawls leans too much towards rigid views of social organisation and distribution of income. Fleschacker argues for a more contextual approach, in which policy solutions emerge in reaction to particular conditions. He argues for public action to be directed against monopolistic economic power, rather than towards distribution of income. Rawls himself is often take as master thinker of left-liberalism and social democracy, but he also been taken up approvingly by some classical liberal and libertarian thinkers including Friedrich Hayek (Law, Legislation and Liberty, Vol. 2 The Mirage of Social Justice, 1979). So if Fleishacker takes Rawls, and tries to move away from the more designed from above elements of Rawls thinking, he certainly has something positive for classical liberals and libertarians. Rawls himself will be dealt with in a future post.

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Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations

By Barry Stocker
September 10th, 2009 at 3:35 pm | 1 Comment | Posted in Economics, UK Politics

carosmithAdam Smith is famous as the founder of economics, then known as political economy. There is never a completely clear case about who is that first at anything but Smith has a very strong case.

His post was that of a Professor at Moral Philosophy at the University of Glasgow.  As a student at Glasgow he studied with the distinguished moral philosopher, Frances Hutcheson.  Hutcheson held the Chair that Smith himself held later.  Hutcheson’s predecessor was the first holder of that chair, Gershom Carmichael, an early figure in the Scottish Enlightenment.  Smith himself was succeeded by Thomas Reid, another major figure of the Scottish Enlightenment.  Smith was a close friend of the philosopher and historian David Hume, who also wrote on economics.  Hume, along with Smith, is the greatest figure in the Scottish Enlightenment; and a leading figure in the whole European movement towards a rational critical attitude towards all areas of knowledge, freed of blind obedience to tradition and authority.  Smith cannot be understood as just an economist. Wealth of Nations is informed by interests in history, political thought, moral philosophy, aesthetics, natural science, sociology, law and so on.

Wealth of Nations contains at the heart of its economic thought the idea that markets should very largely be left alone.  The market works through the desire of individuals to improve their situation, which is a civilising and good thing for the whole of society, as well as individuals.  Voluntary exchanges in the market are liberating compared with exchanges enforced from above, and lead to economic benefits for both sides of the exchange.   Damaging restraints from various sources include: guilds which restrict entry into a trade, monopolies on export and import imposed on trade between colonies and colonising countries, merchants combining to raise prices, aristocratic power over tenant farmers and labourers, and at the extreme – slavery.

Smith recognised that businesses might conspire against the market, but his solution is not for the state to act in a way which limits freedom in the market place, and even less to substitute for market exchanges.  The state should avoid actions which encourage anti-market activities, such as requiring merchants to join some local corporate body where they will meet and very probably conspire to raise prices.  Smith’s concern is to avoid state actions which undermine the market.  A big concern is free trade between nations, though in Smith’s time there was a still a big issue of free trade between different parts of a nation.  The lifting of such barriers was nearly complete in Britain, but as Smith notes is far from complete in France which was much poorer.

In Britain, Smith was concerned with the damaging effects of external customs duties and other import restrictions.  He was also concerned with state enforced monopolies, particularly with regard to the colonies.  He argued that these made the nation weaker by raising prices artificially on goods made in Britain when exported, making them less competitive; and by rising prices artificially on goods imported in Britain, harming consumers.  A major concern was the Corn Laws, which restricted imports and exports on wheat and all grains, raising prices in way which greatly harmed the poorest.

Smith favoured a tax system which favoured the poorest, but not through redistribution of income.  He assumes that normally taxation is on consumption rather than on income or wealth, and favours higher taxes on those goods most consumed by the rich.      Smith believes in an economy in which everyone can become richer, and some people can become very rich; but he has moral reservations about the rich spending money on luxuries, and their apparent tendencies to less morally restrained behaviour than the poor.  Smith’s main arguments for ‘free trade’, in the very broadest sense, are that it enables the poor to improve their condition and become free of dependency on feudal, or monopolistic, employers.

The description of Smith’s economic vision already leads us into his moral and political vision.  His more specific comments on those areas favour representative government and greater individual freedom.  He argues not only that representative government is the best government, but that Ireland and the colonies should be represented equally in the British parliament.  His view of colonialism is that it is bad but comes about from the necessity of protecting trade.  It is best avoided, and if it is not avoided, colonies should be confederated with the coloniser, with equal political rights.  He sees the functions of government as restricted to national defence, law and order, enforcement of property and contracts, and to anything else of public benefit that  private individuals cannot provide.  That last proviso is very open to interpretation. Smith’s own examples suggest that he thinks the proviso should be interpreted in a very modest way.  For example, he discusses education extensively as a public benefit.  Smith argues that education should be compulsory, but that it should be provided by a multiplicity of private sources, and there should be charges with charitable assistance for those too poor too meet the charges .

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