Thoughts on the LibDem Manifesto – At first glance
Our Best Policies:
The £10k tax threshold – easily the best policy in any of the three manifestos and certainly the most radical. Would vote LibDem for this policy alone.
Constitutional change: The power to sack corrupt MPs, reform of the voting system, an elected House of Lords and a Freedom Bill to restore civil liberties etc. Would also vote LibDem for this policy alone…
Passing a new Mutuals, Co-operatives and Social Enterprises Bill – Hallelujah! Not quite sure this needs a specific minister though…
Rule out the like-for-like replacement of the Trident nuclear weapons system – Good!!
Our Worst Policies:
General wetness on public sector bureaucracy – it’s not liberal to have government micromanage our lives so we should be getting rid of a lot more.
Investing £400 million to refurbish shipyards in the North of England and Scotland – those shipyards need investment but it shouldn’t come from the government. Turning them into industrial economic free zones (areas where Corporation tax, Capital Gains tax and Stamp duty do not apply) would do the trick instead…
The entire international development section – it’s one big massive facepalm.
April 14th, 2010 at 5:19 pm
I agree with most of this… I’m interested to hear why you think the International Development bit is a cock-up?
April 14th, 2010 at 5:44 pm
Because it shows that the LibDems subscribe to the typical attitude towards Int.Dev. that all parties and do-gooders do. Although they mean well the truth is that the effects of foreign aid are often perverse to the point where I wonder if it’s proponents either hate the poor or love the poor so much they want there to be more of them.
In recent years a great deal of ‘aid’ money goes to the governments ‘friends’ e.g. with this government lots has gone to Trade Unions.
There’s generally a lack of transparency about how aid is spent. There’s a ‘if it’s money and it’s called aid it must be good’ mentality which I hate. It’s not good if it’s spent on guns. It seems like aid spent badly can take a country 100 steps backwards when aid is spent well it only takes a country 2 steps forward.
I hate this:
“We will crack down on tax havens which allow individuals and corporations to avoid paying taxes to developing countries.”
Just because they’re avoiding paying tax doesn’t necessarily mean they’re bad. If a corporation fiddles its way out of paying tax but is still employing 100s of people in a developing country it is ultimately better than if that corporation leaves the country or ceases to exist.
“Support a global fund for social protection to help developing countries build viable welfare systems.”
Bad. Bad. Bad. It would be better to concentrate on methods that help countries create their own wealth e.g. breaking down trade barriers than to artificially impose ‘welfare states in a box’ on them. Countries will come up with their own welfare systems (note I say ‘systems’ not ‘states’)if you let them. But in order for a country to redistribute wealth there has to be wealth to redistribute in the first place.
April 14th, 2010 at 5:48 pm
Miss Scarlett, Perhaps you might have suggested something a bit more radical with this one:
“Turning them into industrial economic free zones (areas where Corporation tax, Capital Gains tax and Stamp duty do not apply) ”
Perhaps this should be applicable to the whole UK?
Also the UK does not need an elected house of lords, although the life peers could be given the boot (sorry Shirley) and the power of party leaders in the creation of lords stopped, as well as bringing back the hereditary peers. The UK does need an elected English Parliament to sort out the mess of labour’s devolution.
finally, the big question for the liberal democrats, is which policies will you sacrifice to get into government and which will you insist upon?
April 14th, 2010 at 6:01 pm
“Perhaps this should be applicable to the whole UK?”
Eventually applicable to the whole UK. First start with areas of highest unemployment and lowest GVA. Then expand slowly from the poorest upwards.
April 19th, 2010 at 11:34 am
Hi all, been a LibDem for the last six years or so. Used to be something of a Libertarian but would now describe myself as “fiscally conservative, socially liberal” meaning I see no justifiable, principled reasons against the use of state to alleviate social ills, but think we must be limited and cautious in such actions, but ONLY for pragmatic reasons.
Having read some of the bloggers of this site I have a question, what constitutes a small state to you? And what is the guiding philosophy? Is it based primarily on natural rights? That the state is immoral if it, say, takes the fruits of my labour in the form of income tax? I wonder since, I believe all arguments from natural rights inexorably devolve into anarcho-capitalism (one of the reasons why I abandoned Libertarianism) and I would like to know if you really subscribe to a form of incrementalism or you really believe something different.
I look forward to hearing thoughts from my friends on this site.
April 19th, 2010 at 6:01 pm
Hello mpg,
I can’t speak for any member of the Liberal Vision team except myself. I describe myself as socially and economically liberal.
My vision of a small state would be one where the only function of the state is to be an objective arbiter and enforcer of the law. e.g. my ideal state would contain law courts, a police force and not a great deal else.
I do base my philosophy on natural rights. I think it is self-evident that all adults own themselves and the only legitimate transactions are those that all parties involved have consented too.
You’re wrong to think that all arguments from natural rights lead to ‘anarcho-capitalism’. They lead to ‘free market anarchy’ which is something totally different.
I’m a great advocated of friendly societies and cooperatives for instance. These are not ‘capitalist’ ventures. On the contrary they are socialist ventures. The difference is you consent to joining a friendly society or a cooperative. I don’t have a problem with socialism, I have a problem with ‘state socialism’. Ideally I would like to see the NHS completely privatised. In the event of that happening I would take out a health coverage plan with a non-for-profit friendly society.
You use the word ‘devolve’ – I think free-market anarchy would lead to a more favourable and just society than the UK under New Labour, however, I ultimately reject anarchy. There have to be universal laws to enforce universal principals. So I concede that there may be a little involuntary taxation but then, I have heard ways that a minimal state could be paid for by means other than taxation…
As for incrementalism, well, I don’t think the libertarian revolution is coming time soon. I have an article coming up on the IEA blog soon on Free Zones. I do believe in lifting taxes for the poor first and continue upward whilst reducing the state as much as possible.
April 19th, 2010 at 8:31 pm
Hello Sara
Thank you for your elucidating comments. They certainly got me thinking.
You mentioned that involuntary taxation may be a necessary evil in the minimal state. However, this state would surely be violating the principle of natural rights you describe earlier? This was certainly the conclusion I came to when I was into libertarianism. To argue for natural rights and then demand the system to protect such rights, violate that principle is surely a textbook example of self-refutation?
From my point of view, natural rights demand an anarchic society. Since even the minimal state requires coercion of some kind, the minimal state must be immoral. Therefore, only the anarchic state, peopled by people engaged in consensual transactions, is a just state. But I also think an anarchic state would be a failure. Hence, I came to the conclusion that that libertarianism is self-defeating.
But these are only my thoughts. I could be wrong.
April 19th, 2010 at 9:17 pm
“You mentioned that involuntary taxation may be a necessary evil in the minimal state.”
Any involuntary taxation does violate the principle of natural rights I describe earlier. But that’s the difference between libertarianism and anarchy. Libertarians make allowances for a small amount of involuntary taxation anarchists do not.
You’re basically saying libertarianism cannot be followed to the natural conclusion of its premises therefore it shouldn’t be adhered to at all. That’s like saying I can’t afford to go on holiday to Hawaii and stay in a 5* hotel so I won’t go on holiday at all. When actually you could happily afford a 4* stay in Barbados.
Also you think an ‘anarchic state’ would be a failure – you haven’t given any reasons why. I’m guessing you’re an individual who only trusts the free market up to a point.
Once you accept that the biggest cause of injustice in our society today is the state you have to give better reasons for dismissing anarchy. In my humble opinion, free market anarchy would deliver a more just society than what we are currently living in.
April 20th, 2010 at 1:17 am
Hi Sara
Again, very challenging response. Hopefully I can clear up what my thinking is for you, so we can understand where each of us is coming from.
“Any involuntary taxation does violate the principle of natural rights I describe earlier. But that’s the difference between libertarianism and anarchy. Libertarians make allowances for a small amount of involuntary taxation anarchists do not.”
Question: where do libertarians get the right to make allowances for small involuntary taxation.
I believe that natural rights must be universal and absolute, or they are not rights at all. At least, not as I understand them. They would be something else. And if they aren’t universal and absolute, then libertarianism has no foundation. The fact that the minimal state must necessarily infringe natural rights in order to protect such rights, proves that natural rights are not universal and absolute. Ergo, since natural rights, as conceived of by the liberarian, are not universal, they are not rights at all. Libertarianism is self-refuting. At least, so it seems to me.
“You’re basically saying libertarianism cannot be followed to the natural conclusion of its premises…”
True. If the premises of an argument are unsound or invalid, then the argument is unsound or invalid. That’s the law of deductive logic.
“Also you think an ‘anarchic state’ would be a failure – you haven’t given any reasons why. I’m guessing you’re an individual who only trusts the free market up to a point.”
Sorry, I didn’t expand this point as it was only a statement and not an argument. But to clear things up a tad, I suggest that an ANARCHISTIC society, I mis-wrote earlier, which is the only logical conclusion, as I see it, following from the premises of natural law and natural rights, would ultimately be unable to sustain itself. But I think you probably agree with me on this, judging from your earlier comments.
I hope this clears things up a bit. While I’m sure we will disagree on many points, our boats are still sailing in the same general direction.
April 20th, 2010 at 10:09 am
No, sorry. I don’t think we’re on the same page at all. Consider if I apply our disagreement to a different hypothetical:
Theoretical proposition: Murder is wrong.
Reality: We can never create a society were nobody is murdered.
Your argument suggests that because we can never create a society where nobody is ever murdered the proposition that ‘murder is wrong’ has no intrinsic value. Even though you instinctively suspect that ‘murder is wrong’.
Whereas my argument is that even though we can never create a society where nobody is murdered it still leads to a more just society if we still work on the basis that ‘murder is wrong’.
We should still aim for a society where no one is murdered.
April 21st, 2010 at 3:24 pm
I fear that you haven’t understood the nature of my argument judging from your hypothetical, (and which is probably more my fault rather than anything else). I will try and spell my argument out, in syllogistic form, so you can see where I’m coming from. From all the premises I state, I think I have good cause to think they are more probably true than false, are valid and sound.
Here goes; my basic argument:
Premise 1 (P1): Natural rights are true and they are universal and absolute.
P2: Libertarianism is the necessary political conclusion from natural rights.
P3: Libertarianism can coherently support the idea of a coercive state.
(Coercion including involuntary taxation, monopoly of the judiciary, army, police force..)
P4: A coercive state would be in violation of natural rights.
P4*: Therefore libertarianism cannot support the idea of a coercive state.
P5: Therefore P3 is false.
P4* & P5 are very important as I am NOT saying that this means libertarianism is therefore false. Rather that libertarianism cannot coherently, rationally and logically support the idea of a coercive state. You might also remember that I initially argued that the argument for libertarianism (hereafter “L”) necessitates a conclusion to anarcho-capitalism not the small, coercive state you initially described in your first comment to me. This is the next part of my argument.
P6: A non-coercive L state would not have a monopoly on the judiciary, defence, in fact any area of state activity as we know it.
P7: All non-coercive L state enterprises would be voluntary, paid for by voluntary means.
P8: All non-coercive non-state enterprises would be paid for by voluntary means, and could not be restricted by the state.
P9: There is no distinction between the state and non-state enterprises of any kind.
P10: Therefore state enterprises are completely redundant.
P10 encapsulates my belief that if the non-coercion principle is truly held, you wouldn’t have any need for a state at all. In fact, more fundamentally, the state wouldn’t be any different, in any capacity, from a non-state enterprise. I wouldn’t even know what the distinction could be. They state and non-state enterprise would be fundamentally identical.
So now, I think we have arrived exactly where I suggested we would, when following the logic of L to it’s necessary, logical conclusion; we arrive at an anarcho-capitalist society. Now, is this a good thing? Well, in your penultimate post even you identified some integral weaknesses to anarchism. However, I have some additional concerns that lead me to think anarchism is non-viable. I have to go now, but will follow up later today, when I get back.
Cheers.
April 21st, 2010 at 6:16 pm
mpg
Your comments are pertinent when applied to Robert Nozick’s book ‘Anarchy, State and Utopia’, probably the best work of political theory ever from a very purist libertarian point of view. As Sara is not Nozick, I don’t think she is really the best person to answer comments which I think to sum up well some problems with Nozick’s approach.
There is no one libertarian point of view, the term covers anarchists, minimum state libertarians, classical liberals (who overlap with libertarians but on the whole allow a larger state) and many other sub-divisions. There is no automatic link between natural rights theory and libertarianism. John Rawls ‘A Theory of Justice’ which is the great work of political theory for left-liberals and social democrats has a version of natural right theory and a version the kind of argument Nozick has about why rational people should consent to a certain kind of state
In reply to your comments on (Nozickian) libertarianism which I’ve been working on a lot recently
Nozick thinks the minimal state is something we should consent to and should have coercive powers because
1. A ‘dominant protection agency’ for enforcing law inevitably emerges from a situation of free choice between competing agencies, because individuals will seek the protection of the strongest agency.
2. Independents who stay outside the DPA will have to be punlshed if they violate the rights of individuals who stay outside the agency.
3. Independents lack the knowledge to judge their conflicts which the DPA has accumulated
4. Nozick also argues that we cannot punish someone through violating other people’s rights just by treating it like an insurance claim and collecting money from them, we have to punish people with state violence to deter them and reduce the fear of violation of the laws of the DPA
According to Nozick the above shows how a minimal state with coercive powers naturally evolves, rational people will consent to this, and consent can legitimately be inferred to the coercive powers of the minimal state.
If we look at other minimum state thinkers, or near minimum state thinkers, we can see other foundations apart from natural rights
Jeremy Bentham appealed to Utilitarianism, i.e. following rules which promote the greatest welfare of the greatest number
Wilhelm von Humboldt appealed to Idealist and Romantic notions of human character and a society based on free individual cooperation
Herbert Spencer appealed to Darwinism applied to society.
Natural rights could refer to any of the following, and probably some more positions
God’s law
A fixed set of rights outside history known to all rational humans, rooted in our biological and psychological nature
A fixed set of rights outside history known to all rational humans, rooted in our abstract reasoning powers
An evolving set of rights which develop over history as societies acquire more knowledge , in a natural evolutionary process
A ‘nomocratic’ legal discovery process of courts through history
April 21st, 2010 at 6:22 pm
Well, let me wade in if I may. First is the old issue with language. Between you both you are assuming that libertarianism ≠ anarchism. I don’t believe that is right. There are various formulae used within the sprawling family tree of all lovers of liberty, but I’d probably said the most accepted is that libertarianism ⊂ anarchism. And also that libertarianism ⊂ “micarchism”. And that what you two are talking about is the difference between minarchism and anarchism, the adherents of both of which would call a variety of libertarianism (and sometimes, of course, as is the case with so many extended families, they will occasionally and often vociferously claim theirs to be the only “true” libertarianism).
Anyway, semantics aside, I, of course, agree with mpg with his logical argument that anarchism is the only position that involves no coercion whatever. I disagree that it would not work and believe it would shine as a beacon to the rest of the world – and here might be its downfall: that the rest of the world decides to gang up and destroy it because it is so much more attractive than them!
However, I am currently in the middle of an online correspondence with someone who firmly believes that true, zero-state anarchism would likely be less liberal than minarchism, and that therefore whatever minor coercive institutions that were needed to protect the maximum, well, perhaps that should be optimum amount of freedom for all are not even necessary evils, but goods, in that they prevent both something becoming a bigger coercive state and something becoming a less free anarchy.
But, I also certainly agree with Sara in that if we were to conclude somehow that anarchism was indeed impractical, less liberal or simply would not survive, then working toward the smallest government necessary to maintain the basic functions one thinks would not work well in an anarchist society. However, my main problem with that is that maintaining such a minimal state is, to my mind, impossible and that whatever we create in the name of “limited state” will grow and we end up where we are. It immediately creates a “regime of status” as Herbert Spencer described it – of ruled and ruler, which is anathema of course to anarchy and “natural rights” (I would prefer to call these irreducible norms of human action).
But seeing a small state as a possible route to a zero-state is I think a reasonable approach, though I believe an extremely precarious one prone to capture by people more ambitious for the state’s role before we get close. I think an interesting neo-logism for this approach was coined yesterday I think by blogger Paul Lockett, as “lessarchism.”
But I’d be quite interested to hear from both of you really, Sara and mpg, the problems you see with true anarchism.
Oh, and back at semantics for a second – anarchism ≠ anarcho-capitalism. Again anarchism ⊂ anarcho-capitalism, and anarchism ⊂ Mutualism, and anarchism ⊂ Individualist anarchism, and yes, though reluctantly in the same sentence (because I think they mean pretty funamentally different things but are still distant cousins at least) anarchism ⊂ socialist anarchim and so on. I usually describe myself as an Individualist Anarchist or a Mutualist, but do not take offence at being called “Anarcho-Capitalist” so long as my interlocutor understands that what we mean by “capitalism” is quite different from what, say, contemporary discourse of all political hues calls “capitalism”.
Now, I’m off to write the second part of my defence of anarchism against minarchism…
An anarchist is an uncomprimising liberal. • Emile Faguet (1847-1916)
April 21st, 2010 at 6:43 pm
I think I forgot to ask it to send me updates…so subscribing now.
April 22nd, 2010 at 5:22 pm
Sara, Barry & Jock
Thanks for all of your responses. Its been most edifying getting such high quality feedback.
I can only provide general comments at this time, and will write more after tonight’s debate (need another stellar performance from Nick to counteract the Tory media offensive). So here are a few things until my next comment:
My argument, as spelt out previously, is a basic argument against libertarianism from natural rights (as universal and absolute). As such it is unaffected by the fact that other conceptions of libertarianism might survive it, the key point here is that any idea of a libertarian coercive state from natural rights as described in Premise 1, are self-refuting. So the question is,if Premises 1-4 are unsound or invalid, how so?
Barry, I agree that natural rights can be construed in many different ways. However, earlier Sara offered an understanding of natural rights, one I used to espouse, where they are self-evident truths: e.g. I own myself. It was from that basis that our discussion flowed.
Jock, I would also acknowledge that liberatarianism can be an umbrella term, but again, I would direct you to the previous paragraph. The discussion was already defined, albeit in a broad sense, from the outset.
Barry, regarding natural rights. I think natural rights, as self-evident, necessary truths, represent the strongest possible case for a libertarian ideology. However, I am not certain that the ontology of natural rights necessarily effects whether or not natrual rights are universal and absolute. For example if natural rights represent God’s law, they could still be universal and absolute. If natural rights are a fixed set of rights outside history known to all rational humans, rooted in our biological and psychological nature, they are almost certainly universal and absolute. So I guess I would like to know, how the ontology of natural rights has an impact on their universality and absoluteness, and if they are not universal and absolute, in what way does this change the argument for basic libertarianism, (sorry bit wordy, hope its clear-ish). In addition, if natural rights are a set of rules come by from a naturally evolving process and they are not fixed, what kind of argument results from this? What kind of libertarianism? And what is compelling about such an argument, ie, why should it’s conclusion be irresistible to the rational person?
To be continued… Enjoy the debate.
April 22nd, 2010 at 5:25 pm
Barry, one more thing
Your examples of minimum state thinkers from bases other than natural rights surely depend on some overarching universal, don’t they? Eg: Bentham surely holds as universal and absolute that that which promotes the greater good is always to be preferred, wouldn’t this be true?
April 22nd, 2010 at 5:43 pm
Coincidentally I was listening to Roderick Long’s series of lectures, Foundations of Libertarian Ethics today and in the second lecture I think he talks about whether it is good, or right, or beneficial to strive for something even if you know the chances of attaining it are minimal – and he uses the example of how he, as an anarchist, strives towards anarchy, but accepts that it’s unlikely to happen any time soon so also strives to outcomes that are “less than anarchy” but on the way there. So even though your logic is correct, I’m not sure the conclusion you draw from that, that minarchism is not something to strive for, is necessarily correct.
But as I mentioned, there’s also a second issue – yes, it may well be the case that technically an anarchist society would involve no “state” coercion. But the argument of my correspondent at the Counting Cats blog is that it would lead to more coercion because its private law structures and absolutist property rights would exert considerable private coercion, that would make it preferable to have the “limited state” coercion of a minarchy since that would actually produce the maximum freedom for all.
April 22nd, 2010 at 6:26 pm
mpg
No natural right is just ‘self evident’, it has to be defined in some way, even if from some points of views it’s a very inevitable process, which is why we always have to think about which natural right? Since your earlier comments seemed to deal very much with Nozick’s position, though its possible you’re thinking of other authors, the kind of natural right you might be dealing with is Nozick’s which is Locke seen through Kant. Locke: we have rights before we live in a society under laws and political institutions. In the end Locke probably puts that on a religious basis, though his main text on political thought, ‘Essay on Civil Society’ leaves this open. Nozick brings in Kant’s rationalism which suggest that rights are what rational autonomous beings create as universal laws wit h regard to respect for autonomy, with a criterion of universality and consistency. Nozick’s take on this is the though experiment of the ‘experience machine’, in which Nozick argues we always prefer to live a real individual life, than have an imagined perfect life in some hyper tech machine.
With regard to overarching universals.
Yes Bentham’s utilitarian maxim could be taken up from a natural right position, Rawls does something like that, and Hegel did some time before. However, it’s difficult to take Bentham’s maxim itself as a principle of natural law/right since it is more of a criterion for what rules we accept than a basic rule of conduct/rights which is the sort of thing that ‘natural right’ theory in all its many variations is looking for. Rawls suggest that the outcome of utilitarian calculations tends to confirm his arguments from pure principle, and he may be suggesting that it could be a criterion for deciding between different models of society, once we have decided on the basic rules he thinks we should accept before thinking about detailed rules. Hegel suggests that Bentham’s maxim ends up as similar to Kant’s criterion for a good moral principe (the categorical imperative, only will acts that you can will universally). What Hegel is suggesting there is that Kant ends up with abstract rules not genuine rights of real individuals in real societies.
I found it necessary to bring in Rawls and Hegel to clarify the issue about Bentham and universality, neither of who whom are obvious libertarian heroes. In any case, that does not mean that their ideas cannot be taken up from any number of libertarian perspectives, ideas are constantly recontextualised. Some people take Thomas Aquinas as a source of anarchist thought, which I think would have come as a big surprise to the man himself. Some libertarians have argued that Rawls’ arguments lead more in a libertarian direction, than in the social democratic direction Rawls himself took them. Hegel has acquired the pop philosophy image of a totalitarian thinker, but that is not taken seriously by Hegel scholars. Mostly they have taken him as a communitarian, mixing social conservatism and economic egalitarianism. His friend Wilhelm von Humboldt was what we might now call a minimal state libertarian, and has many similarities in his approach to Hegel.
April 22nd, 2010 at 7:04 pm
Barry
By self-evident I mean, apriori. Necessarily true with recourse to experience.
More to come.
April 22nd, 2010 at 7:10 pm
mpg
Thank you for your clarification, however it is just the standard definition of a priori in philosophy which I had in mind when responding to your comments
The point is that a priori arguments are themselves very varied, which is what I’m tried to get at.
There fact is there is not fixed and final a priori idea of what a priori arguments are.
Nozick has one way of trying to explain and justify a priori principles of politics, Rawls has another, if related way, Hegel has another and so on
April 22nd, 2010 at 7:50 pm
Barry
My comment on “apriori” was made in regards to the universality and absoluteness of natural rights such as self-ownership. So with regards to THIS specific argument, I maintain that it is the most potent potential weapon in the armoury of libertarian apologetics in that if such a universal right as self-ownership is true, without condition nor reference to consent, the law of the land, etc, the libertarian establishes indiivudalism independent of recourses to majoritarianism.
Again, settling down to the debate now. To be continued.
April 22nd, 2010 at 9:26 pm
I am convinced that there is “eternal and immutable law” that can be discovered, as Hoppe describes it, and that you do not need human made legislation on top of that, just market-driven “discovery” of precedent based on what is effectively the one “norm” of self-ownership.
April 27th, 2010 at 9:56 pm
Barry
Sorry for such a long delay in responding. I’ve been really busy and I wanted to read your comments properly.
Ok, a few thoughts. You seem to be saying that Nozickian libertarianism (hereafter N) can posit a logically coherent, consistent and rational justification for a coercive state. Lets have a look at your premises individually and see where they take us.
N1: This DPA premise seems okay, although I would have said that given free choice and an anarchic market, no DPA will necessarily remain the DPA indefinitely. N seems to try and smuggle the idea in (if your account of this idea fully reflects his thinking), in order to prop up his eventual conclusion, that since the truly free, anarchic market would lead to a permanently DPA, conferring coercive powers upon it would be acceptable.
N2: Again, this premise may be under defined, but it seems to me that N simply abandons individualism without an adidtional premise to jusitfy this from the previous conviction from Lockean natural rights.
N3: Again, another egregiously unjustified statement, which simply ditches individualism without proper justification. It would seem that N tries to smuggle in a utilitarian justification that allows N to violate, or at least, modify, his previous convictions, when a utilitarian argument cannot trump a universal and absolute right that contradicts a utilitarian right.
N4 & Conclusion: And here is the crux, this seems like special pleading (conceding that you might have left out some crucial sub-premises that might validate this). Why should the individualist now have to accept N notion on punishment. Why not allow a bottom up solution, consistent with individualism? Why should a rational person accept N thoery of punishment, if they hold true a natural immutable right of freedom of contract?
In essence, I can only conclude that N starts by holding natural rights (specifically self-ownership, rights to fruits of labour, freedom of conscience, etc) as universal and absolute, then finds additional reasons for revising this conclusion. I am not so sure, from your summary, that this is at all successful.
Furthermore, N seems to equivocate on the meaning of consensuality. Consensual as it pertains to individualism connotes voluntaryism. N then tries to broaden the meaning of consensual to include consent as something inferred by a ‘social contract’, which is surely explicitly rejected by individualism in the first place, isn’t it?
Now, I accept that you may have unstated premises that could alter the validity and soundness of N as you have presented it. But if you don’t, I think we good reasons for believing that N is unsound.
I welcome your thoughts.
April 27th, 2010 at 10:08 pm
mpg
I am not exactly defending Nozick, I just think he’s someone who should be taken seriously and I explained his position as well as possible. I don’t think I can really add to what I said, I have written something recently on Nozick and another non-libertarian political theorist, Philip Pettit. If you want to see it I am happy to send it to you, if you send and email to me at Barry.Stocker@itu.edu.tr.
I’m not a minarchist/nightwatchman state libertarian. I belong to the more moderate end of libertarianism, sometimes referred to as classical liberalism, though of course there are no absolute divisions between these categories. Of recent ‘normative’ political theorists, that is political theorists writing in the philosophical style of Nozick and Rawls, the closest to the kind of thing I believe in is Gerry Gaus, author of *Justificatory Liberalism*, though I can’t say that this is as good a book as *Anarchy , State and Utopia*.
I don’t make the same kind of absolutist assumptions that Nozick mades about individual rights in ASU, so I’m not really concerned with this issue of justifying a minimal state on such grounds. I think there is a irreducible paradox here, but I also think political theory, and philosophy in general, are concerned with paradox. There is no final answer the paradox in Nozick, but there aren’t any paradox free positions out there, if there were political theory would come to and end.
April 27th, 2010 at 10:28 pm
Barry
Thanks for your reply. As a matter of fact I kind of share your political position, though I am probably more to the left than you.
My only interest at the start of this discussion was to see if a case for libertarianism as defined earlier can be held, and I guess we have arrived at a place where we both agree that questions of this kind aren’t as cut and dried as some people like to assert.
BTW, I would be interested in reading Gerry Gaus and will email you later.
Cheers.